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Abstract
Introduction: Equity and universal coverage currently dominate policy debates worldwide. Health financing
approaches are central to universal coverage. The way funds are collected, pooled, and used to purchase or
provide services should be carefully considered to ensure that population needs are addressed under a universal
health system. The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which the Kenyan health financing system meets
the key requirements for universal coverage, including income and risk cross-subsidisation. Recommendations on
how to address existing equity challenges and progress towards universal coverage are made.
Methods: An extensive review of published and gray literature was conducted to identify the sources of health
care funds in Kenya. Documents were mainly sourced from the Ministry of Medical Services and the Ministry of
Public Health and Sanitation. Country level documents were the main sources of data. In cases where data were
not available at the country level, they were sought from the World Health Organisation website. Each financing
mechanism was analysed in respect to key functions namely, revenue generation, pooling and purchasing.
Results: The Kenyan health sector relies heavily on out-of-pocket payments. Government funds are mainly
allocated through historical incremental approach. The sector is largely underfunded and health care contributions
are regressive (i.e. the poor contribute a larger proportion of their income to health care than the rich). Health
financing in Kenya is fragmented and there is very limited risk and income cross-subsidisation. The country has
made little progress towards achieving international benchmarks including the Abuja target of allocating 15% of
government’s budget to the health sector.
Conclusions: The Kenyan health system is highly inequitable and policies aimed at promoting equity and
addressing the needs of the poor and vulnerable have not been successful. Some progress has been made
towards addressing equity challenges, but universal coverage will not be achieved unless the country adopts a
systemic approach to health financing reforms. Such an approach should be informed by the wider health system
goals of equity and efficiency.
Introduction
Health care financing and equity currently dominate
policy agendas worldwide [1,2]. Governments and inter-
national organisations are recognising that equitable
health systems are essential to achieving health related
millennium development goals, that financing
approaches are critical for the performance of any health
system and for achieving universal coverage [1-3]. Con-
sequently, many low income countries, including Kenya,
are considering how to reform their health financing
systems in a way that promotes equity and efficiency.
In 2005, the 58
th World Health Assembly called for
health systems to move towards universal coverage,
where all individuals have access to “key promotive, pre-
ventive, curative and rehabilitative health interventions
for all at an affordable cost, thereby achieving equity in
access”. It urged member states to ensure that health
financing systems incorporate an element of pre-pay-
ment and risk pooling [1,4]. Universal health systems
seek to be equitable in terms of delivery and financing.
Equitable health financing requires that health care pay-
ments are on the basis of ability to pay; that there exists
financial protection to ensure that everyone in need of
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people at risk of a financial catastrophe and that there
are risk and income cross-subsidies (i.e. from the
h e a l t h yt ot h ei l la n df r o mt h ew e a l t h yt ot h ep o o r ) .
Equitable delivery of health services ensures that people
benefit from health services according to need for care
[1,3]. Responding to the WHO call, the 56
th session of
the regional committee for health in Africa urged mem-
ber states to strengthen their national prepaid health
financing systems, to develop comprehensive health
financing policies and strategic plans and to build capa-
city for generating, disseminating and using evidence
from health financing in decision making. They also
called on the World Health Organization (WHO) to
provide support to fair and sustainable financing and to
identify financing approaches most suitable for the Afri-
can region [5].
Health financing systems have three inter-related
functions, which are central to achieving universal cov-
erage (UC). They include revenue collection, pooling
and purchasing [6]. Revenue collection refers to the pro-
cess by which health systems receive money from
households and organizations. Pooling refers to the
accumulation and management of revenues to ensure
that the risk of paying for health care is borne by all the
members of the pool and not by each contributor indivi-
dually. It embodies the insurance function within a
health system. Pooling can be explicit or implicit: expli-
cit, when people knowingly subscribe to a health insur-
ance scheme; and implicit, where contributions are
through tax revenue [6,7]. Purchasing is the process by
which pooled funds are paid to providers in order to
deliver a set of health interventions. It involves the
transfer of pooled resources to service providers on
behalf of the population for which the funds are pooled
[6]. Purchasing can be strategic or passive [7]: strategic
purchasing involves a continuous search for the best
ways to maximise health systems performance by decid-
ing which interventions should be purchased, while pas-
sive purchasing implies following a pre-determined
budget or simply paying bills when presented. Strategic
purchasing is best for universal coverage. In most cases,
pooling and purchasing are implemented by the same
organisation. Depending on how they are designed, pay-
ment mechanisms can influence provider behaviour [6];
they can act as incentive/disincentives to providers.
Achieving UC will depend on the extent to which coun-
tries combine these functions to ensure there is equita-
ble and efficient revenue generation, the extent to which
financing systems encourage cross-subsidisation and the
degree in which health systems provide or purchase
effective health services for the population [1,7].
The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which
the Kenyan health financing system meets the key
requirements for universal coverage including income
and risk cross-subsidisation. Using the Kutzin frame-
work [6], the paper demonstrates how the Kenyan
health system performs the key financing functions and
the implications of these arrangements for equity and
UC. It also demonstrates the progress Kenya has made
towards achieving internationally accepted benchmarks
in health care financing and makes recommendations
on how the country can progress towards universal cov-
erage. The paper provides a comprehensive description
of Kenya’s health care financing system, how it has
changed over time and the key equity concerns arising
from current, past and upcoming health financing
policies.
History of health care financing in Kenya and implications
for equity
Table 1 provides a summary of key health financing pol-
icy developments in Kenya. Following independence in
1963, the Kenyan post-colonial government made uni-
versal health care a major policy goal. Two years after
independence, the post-colonial government abolished
user fees that were implemented by the colonialist.
Health services were funded primarily through general
tax up to 1988, when the Kenyan government yielded to
pressure from the World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund to introduce user fees and other major
reforms in the health sector. Poor economic perfor-
mance, inadequate financial resources and declining
budgets were some of the reasons given to justify the
introduction of user fees [8]. In the post colonial period,
user fees were first introduced in 1989, but were sus-
pended in 1990 and reintroduced in phases in 1991 [9].
Reasons for the failure of the 1989 implementation were
attributed to various factors including: hurried imple-
mentation; massive declines in utilisation of health ser-
vices; lack of quality improvements; and poor revenue
collection [9-12]. Following the reintroduction in 1991,
user fees were charged for individual services like drugs,
injections, and laboratory services, instead of consulta-
tion as was previously the case. Revenue collected was
returned to the district level to cater for public health
needs within the district and facilities developed detailed
plans for spending 75% of the revenue. A waiving policy
to protect the poor was put in place, and children below
five years were exempted from all charges, but in reality
waiving mechanisms hardly existed [10].
User fees and other out-of-pocket payments (OOPs)
have impacted negatively on utilisation of health care
services in Kenya [12-15]. The majority of the popula-
tion cannot afford to pay for health care, the poor are
less likely to utilize health services when they are ill, and
wide disparities in utilization exist between geographical
regions and between urban and rural areas [14,15].
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inpatient care than outpatient care. Those who pay for
care incur high costs that are sometimes catastrophic
and adopt coping strategies with negative implications
for their socio-economic status, while other simply fail
to seek care [16,17].
In addition to user fees, the government encouraged
development of the private health sector, a move that
saw an upsurge in private health care providers in the
country. Many private providers came up to respond to
the demand for health care. Since public hospitals
charged fees and were perceived to offer low quality
care, people opted to pay for private services that were
perceived to be of better quality. The private sector has
since grown in Kenya, owning 49% of health services
and regulating it remains a major challenge [18].
Methods
The findings presented in this paper are from a review
of both published and gray literature mainly sourced
from the Ministry of Medical Services (MOMS) and
Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation (MOPHS). Key
documents reviewed included the Kenya national health
accounts, Kenya health expenditure and utilisation sur-
vey reports and public expenditure reviews. Also
reviewed to establish government commitment to equity
were various policy documents including the Kenya
health policy framework, the second national health sec-
tor strategic plan of 2005-2010, and the health policy
and financing strategy. Country level estimates data
were used except where the same were lacking at coun-
try level, in which case data were sought from interna-
tional organisations websites including the WHO.
Where large discrepancies existed between data reported
at country level and those acquired from international
organisations, we sought opinions from the ministries of
health officials on the extent to which these data
reflected reality.
Each financing mechanism was analysed in respect to
key functions including revenue generation, pooling and
purchasing [6]. All expenditure data were entered in
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, and bar charts and line
graphs generated. Ethical approval was obtained from
the Kenya Medical Research Institute (Protocol number
1609).
Results
Overview of health care financing and government health
expenditure
Health care funds in Kenya come from the public (gov-
ernment), private (private companies and households)
and donors. Out-of-pocket payments remain the largest
Table 1 Development of health care financing policies in Kenya
Years Policy Equity impacts
Colonial
period
User fees in all public facilities Discriminative policy against Kenyans, imposed by colonial
government
1963-
1965
User fees initially introduced continued to exist for two years after
independence
Negative impacts of affordability and utilisation of health care
services
1965 User fees removed at all public health facilities. Health services
provided for free and funded predominantly through tax revenue
Potential for equity provided there are mechanism to ensure that
the poor benefit from tax funded system
1989 User fees introduced in all levels of care. Negative impact on demand for health care especially among the
poorest population; decreased utilisation including essential
services like immunisation
1990 User fees suspended in all public health facilities. Waivers and
exemption put in place to protect the poor and vulnerable. Failure
linked to poor policy design and implementation.
Increase in utilisation patterns, confirming previous reports that
user fees are a barrier to access.
1991-
2003
User fees were re-introduced in 1991, through a phased
implementation approach stating from hospital level. Children under
five, special conditions/services like immunisation and tuberculosis
were exempted from payment. User fees continued to exist in Kenya
at all levels of care.
User fees major barrier to access, high out-of-pocket payment,
catastrophic impacts, and negative implications for equity.
2004 User fees abolished at dispensaries and health centres (the lowest
level of care), and instead a registration fees of Kenya shillings 10
and 20 respectively was introduced. Children under five, the poor,
special conditions/services like malaria and tuberculosis were
exempted from payment.
Utilisation increased by 70%; the large increased was not sustained,
although in general utilisations was 30% higher than before user
fee removal. Adherence to the policy has been low, due to cash
shortages
2007 All fees for deliveries at public health facilities were abolished No data on extent to which policy was implemented and no
evaluation has taken place.
2010 A health sector services fund (HSSF) that compensates facilities for
lost revenue associated with user fee removal introduced.
Dispensaries and health centre receive funds directly into their bank
accounts from the treasury.
Possible positive impacts on adherence to fee removal policy and
equity.
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total health expenditure (THE) in 2001/2002, and 35.9%
in 2005/2006 [19,20]. Government spending on health
accounted for 29.6% of THE in 2001/2002, and 29.3% in
2005/2006. Estimates of the 2008/2009 national health
accounts indicate that this pattern might have changed,
with the government contributing 35% of THE and
households contributing 24.1%. Donors’ contribution to
the health sector in Kenya is relatively large and has
increased dramatically in the last decade [19,20]. In
1994, donor funds only accounted for 8% of THE. This
proportion increased to 16% in 2001/2002 and to 31.0%
in 2005/2006. It is estimated that donor expenditure on
health in 2008/09 amounted to 40.6% of THE [21].
Between 2001/2002 and 2005/2006, the total contribu-
tions of donor funds to total health expenditure
increased from US$ 118.9 million to US$ 298.6 million.
A large proportion of these funds (78%) went to funding
HIV/AIDS related programmes[22].
Revenue collection
Source of funds and contribution methods
Government tax revenue and government spending on
health
General tax revenue is generated from value added tax
(30%); personal income tax (24%), company tax (14%),
and fuel tax (13%). Import and excise duty each account
for 10% of total revenue. Personal income tax is struc-
tured progressively, and therefore can be considered
equitable. Contribution rates range from 10% for the
lowest income bracket to 30% for the highest income
brackets. Individuals earning less than Kenya shillings
(KES) 133,620 per year are exempted from paying
income tax. Value added tax (VAT) is charged at 16%.
VAT contributions are likely to be regressive because
prices of goods and services do not discriminate by
income, although some goods are exempted from VAT
payment. Corporate income tax ranges from 20% (for
new companies) to 37.5% (for non-resident companies).
A proportion of these taxes are allocated to funding
health care services in the country.
Figure 1 shows government’s allocation to the health
sector. In 2005/2006, government health expenditure
(GHE) accounted for 5.73% of total government’sb u d -
get. This proportion increased to 7.9% in 2006/2007. In
2007/2008, GHE as a percentage of government’s budget
declined to 6.4% and to 6.0% in 2008/2009. It was
expected to increase to 6.9% in 2009/2010. Total gov-
ernment health expenditure as a share of GDP has
remained below 2% in the last decade. There has been
an increase in total government expenditure on health
over time [18,22-26]. For example, between 2003/2004
and 2006/2007, total GHE increased from US$ 215.8
million to US$ 373.8 million. In 2007/08, total GHE
declined by 21.1%, but increased by 54% in 2008/09.
Estimates for 2010/11 and 2011/12 show an expected
l a r g ei n c r e a s ei nt o t a le x p e n d i t u r ea m o u n t i n gt oU S $
614 million and US$ 673.9 million respectively [26]. Per
capita expenditure increased from 5 US$ in 2000/01 to
13.8 in 2007/2008, declined to US$ 10.6 in 2007/2008
and increased to US$ 11 in 2008/09. This increase
reflects growth in absolute amount of expenditures allo-
cated to health.
Out-of-pocket payments
The Kenyan health sector relies heavily on out-of-pocket
payments (OOPs). OOPs are charged for health services
sought from both the public and private sector. Out-of-
pocket payments as percentage of total health
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2002 and 2005/2006 respectively. OOPs spending per
capita amounted to Kenya shillings (KES) 819 (US$
11.7) in 2003 and KES 578 (US$ 8.3) in 2007. Figure 2
shows the distribution of out-of-pocket spending for the
years 2003 and 2007. Rural households reported signifi-
cantly lower OOPs per capita of KES 387 (US$5.1) and
236 (US$ 3.1) in 2003 and 2007 respectively, compared
to urban households who spent KES 912 (US$ 12) and
699 (US$ 9.2). Large differences in OOPs existed
between provinces. The highest level of OOPs per capita
spending was reported in Nairobi province in both 2003
and 2007 (KES 1436 and 1089 respectively), and the
lowest reported in Western province (KES 255 and 205
respectively).
The amount of user fees revenue generated from pub-
lic health facilities has increased gradually over the
years. Total user fees collections amounted to US$ 13.2
million in 2003/2004. It increased to US$ 18.7 million
in 2005. In 2008, total user fees revenue from all public
health facilities amounted to US$ 25.7 million. Revenue
collected at provincial and district hospitals show an
increasing trend since 2003, while revenue collection at
health centers and dispensaries has been on the decline
(Figure 3).
Health insurance
Health insurance in Kenya is very low and comprises
both mandatory and voluntary insurance schemes. Only
about 10% of Kenyans have health insurance. Health
i n s u r a n c ec o v e r a g ei sh i g h e ra m o n gt h eu r b a np o p u l a -
tion (19.7%), compared to the rural population (7.4%);
and among the richest (26.4%) compared to the poorest
population (1.9%) [15].
The National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) is the
main type of health insurance in Kenya. It was estab-
lished by an act of parliament in 1966 as a department
under the ministry of health (MOH). The NHIF has
undergone a series of restructuring over the years. For
example, it was initially set to offer health insurance
coverage to formal sector employees only, but in 1972,
the Act was amended to incorporate voluntary member-
ship, although in practice voluntary membership was
only implemented in 2005. In 1990, the Act was
repealed to allow contribution on a progressive basis
and in 1998 the NHIF was transformed into a state cor-
poration, delinking it from the MOH. The NHIF Act
also provides for hospitals to get loans from NHIF to
improve on service provision. Membership to the NHIF
is mandatory to those working in the formal sector
(both public and private) and voluntary for those work-
ing in the informal sector. Contribution to the NHIF
ranges from KES 30 (US$ 0.4) for the lowest income
groups, to KES 300 (US$ 3.8) for individuals earning
above KES 15000 per month. Historically, these contri-
bution rates were structured progressively (i.e. the rich
contributed a higher proportion of their income than
the poor), but this progressivity no longer exists since
contribution rates have not been reviewed for the last
44 years of NHIF existence, while salary levels have
increased significantly over time.
Voluntary health insurance- whether formal or infor-
mal- is very limited in Kenya. NHIF offers membership
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Page 5 of 14to the informal sector workers on a voluntary basis.
Contributions for the informal sector are a flat rate of
KES 160 per month (US$ 2.5). This suggests that infor-
mal sector NHIF contributions are regressive since the
sector is very diverse and consists of both wealthy and
poor populations. Following the introduction of user
fees, a number of community based health insurance
schemes (CBHIs) were initiated through donor support.
Most of these CBHIs were not sustainable and discon-
tinued operations following the withdrawal of donor
funds. There are about 32 registered CBHIs in Kenya
[27]. Community Based Health Insurance schemes in
Kenya mainly operate in rural areas and are relatively
small, undermining the potential for risk pooling and
cross-subsidisation.
Private health insurance has been developing fairly
well in recent years. There are three types of private
health insurance providers in Kenya [28]: (1) General
insurance companies that are involved in a wide range
of insurance, not related to health, but who to a small
extent insure people against ill health; (2) those that run
medical schemes and are also health care providers
operating their own clinics and hospitals where their cli-
ents seek care, although the same facilities are open to
non-premium holders; (3) those that provide health care
through third party facilities, also known as health man-
agement organisations, which are widely used for
employer based insurance. In 2007, there were 14 pri-
vate insurance companies offering health insurance in
Kenya, with membership of about 600,000 people. Due
to the high cost of premiums, membership to private
health insurance comprises of the wealthiest population
and is highest in the urban areas. For example, in 2007,
24.7% of Nairobi residents reported having private
health insurance, while membership in other provinces
w a sl e s st h a n5 %[ 1 5 ] .C o n t r i b utions to private health
insurance are likely to be progressive, but although this
can be cited as a positive element of this financing
mechanism, it is only the members of these insurance
schemes who benefit from it. Moreover, private health
insurance often cream skim and fail to cover people
with chronic conditions like HIV/AIDS, or when they
do, the premiums are unaffordable. Consequently, peo-
ple suffering from long-term illnesses cannot buy a
cover-even when they can afford one- and they are
therefore left to rely on public care which is already
under-resourced. As a way of encouraging membership
to private health insurance, individuals with private
health insurance cover benefit from tax relief. This
means that the poor tax payers subsidize health care for
the rich, a factor that promotes inequities in the system.
Collecting organisations
General taxes are collected by the Kenya Revenue
Authority. There has been a steady increase in the
amount of revenue collected since 2002, a factor asso-
ciated with better revenue collection systems including
electronic tax returns and strict penalties on defaulters.
The local government also collects revenue that is used
to support infrastructure at the local level. A proportion
of this revenue funds approximately 100 health facilities,
which are owned and operated by the local government.
OOPs are collected by both private and public health
care providers directly at the health facilities where care
is sought. Government health facilities are allowed to
retain 75% of revenue and the remaining 25 percent is
forwarded to the district to support promotive and pre-
ventive services in the area. The NHIF collects monthly
contributions from all members through payroll deduc-
tions for formal employees. Voluntary members make
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offices. Other collecting organisations include CBHIs
and private health insurance schemes.
Pooling of health care resources and allocation
mechanisms
There is very minimal risk pooling in Kenya and hence,
very limited cross-subsidisation. Apart from tax funding,
other forms of pooling include the NHIF, private health
insurance, CBHIs and to some extent donor funding
where funds are channelled through the general budget
support. Only 4% of all health funds are pooled through
health insurance. The NHIF operates as a single risk
pool making it the largest risk pool in the country.
There are about 2 million workers and 8 million depen-
dents covered by the NHIF, which amounts to about
twenty per cent of the population [29].
Public funds are transferred from the Ministry of
Finance to MOMS and MOPHS, who in turn transfer
funds to the districts. Districts develop annual opera-
tions plans and prepare budgets for the year, which they
submit to the district headquarters for consideration.
The annual operation plans and budgets form the basis
for resource allocation to the facilities. There exist two
resource allocation formulas in Kenya, designed to allo-
cate resources to primary level facilities (dispensaries
and health centres) and district hospitals. The formulas
include variables related to population structure, disease
burden, infrastructure, poverty levels, utilisation patterns
and hospital capacity. Informal discussions with MOMS
and MOPHS officials suggested the formulas are hardly
applied and were initially developed to allocate opera-
tion and maintenance costs only. Historical incremental
approach remains the main basis of resource allocation
in Kenya (Personal communication, Ministry of health
official). Detailed informati o no nt h ef o r m u l a sa r ep r e -
sented in Table 2.
Contributions to voluntary health insurance are allo-
cated either through individual risk (for private health
insurance) or community rated payments for CBHIs.
Donor funds are mainly allocated directly to projects,
although some donors fund directly through govern-
ment budget support. Donor funds that are pooled
through the government budget are allocated using the
historical incremental approach. Although no figures
were available on the amount of donor funds channelled
through the government budget, informal interviews
with MOH officials suggested that they are minimal
since most donors are reluctant to fund through budget
support. Discussions have been ongoing for a long per-
iod about the need for development partners to adopt a
sector wide approach to funding the health sector,
where all external funds are pooled and reallocated to
priority areas, but progress has been slow (personal
communication, MOMS and MOPHS officials). The cri-
teria used by donors to target specific regions is not
clear, but for disease specific projects, donor funding in
Kenya has mainly focused on HIV/AIDS, malaria and to
a small extent, reproductive health.
Purchasing, provider payment mechanisms and benefit
package
Health services in Kenya are purchased by different
organisations through various mechanisms. The main
purchasers are the MOMS and MOPHS, which operate
191 government hospitals, 465 health centres and 2122
dispensaries [18]. Other purchasing organisations
include local government, NHIF, CBHIs, private health
insurance and employers [19].
Public sector facilities are allocated budgets and staff
are paid salaries using pooled tax funds. Some donors
have allocated money to the Kenyan government to sup-
port the employment of nurses in remote rural areas.
Donor funds under this arrangement are used to pay
nurses salaries employed on a contract basis. There is
no agency responsible for ensuring that public funds
allocated to health providers are used appropriately. The
NHIF works closely with public and private health facil-
ities country wide to ensure all members have access to
quality services. There are about 400 accredited health
facilities that offer generalized, specialized and emer-
gency healthcare services. Hospitals are accredited using
a criteria that takes into account the range of services
provided within a facility, personnel, bed capacity, infra-
structure and equipment [30]. Payment to providers
accredited to NHIF is through a flat daily rate. The
reimbursement rates are determined based on the range
Table 2 Resource allocation formulas for Kenya
Health centres and dispensaries
Variables Weight
Infrastructure 0.15
Under fives 0.2
Poverty levels 0.3
HIV/AIDS cases 0.05
Female population (15-49 years) 0.2
Area (square kilometre) 0.1
Total 1
District hospitals
Poverty 0.2
Beds utilised 0.4
Out-patient cases 0.2
Accident prone facilities 0.05
Fuel costs 0.15
Total 1
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unit, number of health personnel, laboratories, operating
theatres, overall area occupied, number of wards and
ambulances [30]. Hospitals with large bed capacity and
which offer a wide range of services receive higher reim-
bursement rates than smaller hospitals.
All Kenyans are entitled to health care provided
through government facilities if they can pay user fees.
Through tax revenue, the government subsidises all ser-
vices provided in public health facilities and also meets
the costs of waivers and exemptions for specific groups
of the population (for example, children under five are
exempted from any user fees, ante-natal services and
specific heath conditions including tuberculosis, leprosy,
psychiatric services do not attract any user fees). The
Kenyan public health care system faces many challenges
and while people are entitled to benefits provided
through the public health care system, the reality is that
good quality services are not always available [31]. Bene-
fits arising from OOPs are proportional to the amount
of money paid and are only accessible to the person
making payment.
The NHIF act of 1998 entitles members to both out-
patient and inpatient benefits although the former has
not been implemented. NHIF provides an inpatient
cover of up to KES 396,000 per year for the contributor,
spouse and children. It covers up to 280 inpatient days
per member and their beneficiaries each year [32,33].
The benefit package for the NHIF differs by type of
facility, but it covers all diseases and maternity care. All
government facilities, including teaching and referral
hospitals, provide comprehensive cover to NHIF mem-
bers without any copayments [33]. Individuals seeking
care from faith based facilities and some small size pri-
vate-for-profit facilities also enjoy comprehensive bene-
fits, but a copayment of KES 15000 may be charged in
cases of surgery, at the discretion of the health facility.
Benefits at private facilities include a flat daily payment
rate that differs depending o nt h es i z ea n dk i n do fs e r -
vices available at the hospital and ranges from KES 400
to KES 1800 [32]. The reimbursement rates often form
a small proportion of the total costs of care and people
seeking care from private hospitals have to meet the
remaining costs through OOPs or other forms of pay-
ment including private health insurance or employers
related medical schemes.
Benefit packages under private health insurance are
premium rated and vary from basic packages normally
affordable to middle income groups, to sophisticated
packages that are mainly designed to meet the needs of
the richest populations. Benefit packages for CBHI
members mainly involve inpatient care and are often
linked to specific health providers, usually private-not-
for profit or public health facilities. Private-for-profit
services rarely provide services to CBHIs due to their
high cost. Benefits related to donor funds are project
specific and since it is not always clear how decisions
are made in terms of what projects to fund and in
which settings; it is difficult to exclusively assess the
benefit packages under different projects. An overview
of the Kenyan health financing system in terms of its
key functions identified through the Kutzin [6] frame-
work is presented on Appendix 1.
Responding to equity challenges: Policy developments to
address inequities in the Kenyan health system
The Kenyan government has a commitment to pro-
mote equity. A series of reforms are under way to
address equity challenges in the Kenyan health system.
Key among these reforms is the development of a
health financing strategy [34] and the sector plan for
health (2008-2012) [35]. Both documents highlight
equity in access to health services as a priority area.
The financing strategy aims at an equitable financing
system, documents the policy options and highlights
priority health sector reforms for achieving universal
health coverage. Specific actions highlighted in the
strategy include: implementing a national health insur-
ance scheme; channelling funds directly to health facil-
ities without passing through the district; increasing
resources to underserved and disadvantaged areas and;
scaling up the output based approach of financing
(OBA) to include a range of health services (currently
OBA in Kenya focuses on reproductive health ser-
vices). The financing strategy is still in the early stages
of implementation and it is not possible to assess the
extent to which it will promote equity. Nonetheless,
developing the financing strategy is an important step
towards promoting equity and universal coverage in
Kenya.
User fees at dispensaries and health centres were
eliminated in 2004 and a flat registration fee of KES 10
and KES 20 respectively was introduced. Evidence sug-
gest that user fees continue to be charged but charging
levels remain lower than they were prior to the policy
change [36,37]. Other reforms targeting the primary
care level involve ensuring that these facilities receive
their budget allocations on time. Health centres and dis-
pensaries have in the past spent less than half of their
budgetary allocations and cited delays in receiving funds
from the district as one of the major reasons for the
under spending [26]. For example, in 2008/09, dispen-
saries and health centres only spent 36.7% of budget
allocations. To address this problem and also ensure
that facilities are compensated for lost revenue arising
from user fees removal, the government has introduced
the health sector services fund (HSSF). Details on the
HSSF are provided on Table 1.
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health insurance, which will include transforming the
NHIF to cover all Kenyans. The national health insur-
ance proposal drew attention both locally and interna-
tionally in 2004/2005 but was met with resistance from
various stakeholders including political leaders, employ-
ees and employers and private insurance companies.
The Bill was highly controversial, it was nevertheless
passed in parliament, but the president declined to sign
it due to a mix of both technical and political reasons.
Discussions on national health insurance were initiated
again in 2007 and in September 2008, the Minister for
Medical Services announced that the preparations for
the scheme were at an advanced stage. Under the pro-
posed scheme, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF)
will be reformed and will purchase comprehensive
health insurance for all contributors to the fund. Contri-
butions will be income rated, with rates ranging from 2
to 2.5% of employees monthly salary. The bill has how-
ever not been taken to parliament.
The NHIF has been going through a series of
reforms in recent years as part of its transformation
process to a national health insurance scheme. The
introduction of a national health insurance scheme is
regarded as the catalyst for achieving universal cover-
age in Kenya. Recent changes include: (1) actively seek-
ing to increase coverage among the informal sector
through conducting outreach activities in both urban
and rural areas. (2) The scheme provides a comprehen-
sive cover to those seeking inpatient care in govern-
ment and faith based facilities; (3) Plans are under way
to broaden the benefit package to include outpatient
care. A pilot project was conducted in a rural and
urban district to assess the impacts of an outpatient
cover on utilisation patterns and costs. (4) A revision
of the contribution rates has been proposed. Current
contribution rates were set in 1966, and have not been
r e v i s e dt ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h eh i g hc o s t so fs e r v i c e s
and inflation. The new rates are structured progres-
sively and involve an increment of over 500 per cent
for high income earners [38]. These rates were
required to be implemented in September 2010, but
they have faced strong opposition from trade unions,
and the matter is currently in the high court [39].
Other recent NHIF reforms include decentralisation to
ensure that services are close to the people. Until
recently, the NHIF was highly centralised in Nairobi
where all claims were processed. Health facilities in the
rest of the country were required to make monthly trips
to Nairobi to pursue their claims, leading to high trans-
action costs for members and health care providers. The
NHIF has now decentralised claims processing to dis-
trict offices to facilitate a shorter and more effective sys-
tem that will allow speedy reimbursement of medical
claims. The NHIF has so far opened 28 branches across
all provinces, in both rural and urban areas. Other
changes include simplified, computerised claim proce-
dures and the establishment of an electronic data base.
These improvements have made it easier for members
and health providers to make claims faster and at a rela-
tively low cost.
Discussion
This paper set to examine the Kenyan health system in
terms of key financing functions namely: revenue collec-
tion, pooling and purchasing. Here, the main findings
are discussed and recommendations made on how the
Kenyan health system can make progress towards uni-
versal coverage.
The results show that out-of-pocket payments remain
the main sources of health care funds in Kenya. The
negative consequences of OOPs are well documented
[11,13,17,40-44]: they are regressive; are considered the
worst form of health care financing; they lead to cata-
strophic financial payment and impoverishment, espe-
cially among the poor; and are a major barrier to health
care. Waiving mechanisms introduced to protect the
poor from paying user fees have not been effective in
Kenya or other parts of Africa [10,11,45]. Efforts have
been made to reduce user fees at the primary care level
where varying charges were replaced with a standard fee
of KES 10 and KES 20 for dispensaries and health cen-
tres respectively. While this is an important step
towards promoting access to health care among the
poorest populations, similar reforms should be imple-
mented at the hospital level. Strong commitments to
move away from user fees and other forms of OOPs
towards tax funding and health insurance are required.
However, it is worth noting that the majority of Kenyans
work in the informal sector and poverty levels are high;
suggesting that even with the introduction of mandatory
health insurance, a large number of Kenyans would still
require to be fully covered through tax funding. Caution
should therefore be taken when introducing any finan-
cing reforms to ensure that the needs of the poor and
vulnerable are protected and that they are implemented
within the context of universal coverage [46].
An important indicator of government’sc o m m i t m e n t
to health is the proportion of government’s budget allo-
cated to the sector. In 2001, African heads of states met
in Abuja and committed to allocating at least 15% of
annual budgets to the health sector. Government spend-
ing on health in Kenya is less than half the Abuja target
[26] and has been declining, in addition to being the
lowest in East and Southern Africa [47]. Although very
few African countries have achieved the Abuja target,
most countries are slowly increasing their allocation to
the health sector [47], with the exception of Kenya. The
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a case for more investment in health to attain the aver-
age of US$ 34 per capita expenditure needed to make
health care accessible to the entire population [48].
There has been a steady increase in Kenya’s government
health expenditure per capita from US$ 5 in 2000/2001,
to US$ 13.4 in 2007/2008. This increment reflects the
growth in absolute terms of government’s allocation to
the health sector. When donor funds are incorporated
into the analysis, total health expenditure per capita
increased significantly to US$ 27 in 2005/2006 [19].
Although the commission recommended that developing
countries be supported by donors to achieve the US$ 34
target, the increase in per capita spending on health in
Kenya is largely due to an influx in donor support for
HIV/AIDS. Per capita spending would be significantly
lower if HIV/AIDS related funds were excluded from
the analysis. While donor funds have significantly con-
tributed to better access to health care in Kenya, parti-
cularly for people living with HIV/AIDS, they should
supplement but not replace government funding.
The Kenyan government should aim at gradually
increasing their share to the health sector to avoid ser-
ious drawbacks should donor funds be significantly
reduced or suspended. Various alternatives can be
adopted to increase the proportion of government funds
allocated to the health sector. First, the government can
simply increase the share of budget allocated to health,
and in so doing reduce the percentage share allocated
to other sectors. While this may appear relatively
straightforward, it can have some challenges including,
opposition from other sectors that are also advocating
for more resources. Health is influenced by many other
factors beyond the ministries of health for example,
education, agriculture, and housing. Reducing the share
allocated to these sectors could negatively impact on
the health status of the population. Nevertheless, some
negotiations should be done to increase the share of
health spending in a way that does not undermine
other sectors influencing health. Secondly, the govern-
ment can direct efforts towards increasing the amount
of revenue collected through strengthening taxation of
corporate and personal incomes, and allocate a large
proportion of the increased revenue to the health sec-
tor. Interestingly, the Kenyan government has been
recording massive increments in the amount of tax rev-
enue, but this has not translated to any noticeable
increment to the percentage share of government bud-
get allocated to health. Thirdly, earmarking some taxes
for health care might ensure that a certain proportion
of government revenue is protected for the health sec-
tor, and in so doing increase the budgetary allocations
to the level required to provide the essential package
for health.
The Kenyan health financing system is very fragmen-
ted. Fragmentation refers to the existence of a large
number of separate financing mechanisms and a wide
range of health care providers in a country [49]. It exists
when funds collected from different financing mechan-
isms are not pooled and people from different socioeco-
nomic status are covered under different arrangements
[49]. OOPs present the main form of fragmentation in
the Kenyan health system. Other forms of fragmentation
exist in the form of NHIF, CBHIs, private insurance and
donor funding. The NHIF mainly covers people working
in the formal sector; private health insurance companies
cover the high income groups, while most CBHI mem-
bers are small scale farmers. There is very limited
income cross-subsidisation in CBHIs and private health
insurance since members are of similar socio-economic
status, and they often exclude the poorest. For example,
each of the 32 CBHIs in Kenya functions independently,
resulting to very small pools that offer limited protec-
tion to a minority of the population. Plans are underway
to integrate all CBHI schemes in Kenya, but it is still
unclear what aspects will be managed under the larger
pool. Although the NHIF enjoys high membership,
these funds are not pooled together with CBHI contri-
butions, or with tax funding. The local government also
collects revenue and funds 100 health facilities country
wide. Revenue from the local government is not pooled
with tax funds allocated to the ministries of health.
Donor funds are also very fragmented; most projects
operate independently, and it is common to have differ-
ent donors funding similar health projects within the
same district, but with little, if any, cooperation in terms
of financing, operations and service delivery. Funding
specific health programmes independently undermines
sustainability of health financing. The WHO has called
f o rb e t t e rc o o r d i n a t i o no fd o n o rf u n d st oe n s u r et h a t
external funds are consistent with countries priorities
and within the broader objective of universal coverage
[4]. Failure to pool donor resources in Kenya promotes
inequities because they are not considered when govern-
ment allocations are being made, especially where
regions with less need benefit from significant donor
funding and also receive a large share of government
funding.
Fragmentation is not unique to Kenya. Health systems
in low and middle income countries have in the past
been highly fragmented. Some countries including
Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Thailand, are making progress
towards universal coverage under a less fragmented sys-
tem. Other countries including South Africa and Tanza-
nia are in the process of implementing major reforms
that will promote harmonization and universal coverage
[49-51]. Various authors highlight the need to harmo-
nize health care financing arrangements if universal
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health financing should be approached from a systemic
perspective that is informed by policy goals, rather than
implementing piece meal reforms, which focus on each
source of funding independently and in so doing pro-
mote fragmentation and segmentation. It is clear that
past and current health reforms in Kenya have not
adopted a systemic approach to health care financing. A
potential starting point for promoting a unitary system
is to pool NHIF funds with tax funding and purchase
health services centrally. Linking CBHIs and other
microfinance institutions offering financial risk protec-
tion to those outside the formal sector with the NHIF,
in order to maximise income cross-subsidisation would
also promote harmonisation. Ensuring that donor funds
are integrated in the health system to ensure a coherent
approach to health care delivery is also critical.
The way health care resources (tax, donor funds,
health insurance) are allocated to purchase health care
services has implications for equity and universal cover-
age. Allocation of public health funding in Kenya is
done on a historical incremental basis. Resource alloca-
tion formulas exist, but they are hardly applied. Relying
on an incremental approach to allocate funds promotes
inequities since demand and supply factors are the
major determinants of budgetary allocation. Historically
advantaged regions (i.e. those with high number of
health facilities), receive larger budgetary allocations
than disadvantaged regions with less health facilities.
The Kenyan government should ensure that resources
are allocated according to need. A potential starting
point is to review the formulas presented in Table 2.
The main indicators captured in the current formulas
relate to infrastructure and utilisation patterns, which
suggest that they allow for historical allocation. Need
based indicators that have been widely shown to pro-
mote equity in resource allocation including population
size, infant mortality and under five mortality are not
included in the formulas [49]. An important element of
ensuring that equity is achieved and that need based
resource allocation is widely accepted is to estimate
equity targets for each hospital or geographical region.
These equity targets should guide reallocation of
resources in a phased manner to ensure that facilities
make adjustments in preparation for budgetary incre-
ments or reductions and that opposition is minimised.
Donor funds constitutes a large proportion of health
expenditure and depending on how they are allocated,
they can promote or hinder equity. Where funds are
channelled directly through project funding, inequities
can exist, especially when donors show preference for
one geographical location based on purely practical and
historical reasons rather than need for care. Channelling
donor funds through the budget support and ensuring
that the same are allocated to different regions using a
need based formula can promote equity. This however
requires that the government can be trusted by donors
to spend funds efficiently. Nevertheless it is important
that donor funds are allocated and managed in a way
that is consistent with the broad objective of the Kenyan
financing system in order to support the country’s move
towards universal coverage.
Only a minority of Kenyans have insurance cover. The
majority of Kenyans with health insurance cover work in
the formal sector and comprise the richest population.
The NHIF is the main source of insurance cover for indi-
viduals working in the formal sector, and although it
allows voluntary membership for informal sector workers,
coverage levels remain low [15]. Plans are under way to
introduce a national health insurance scheme that offers
financial protection to all Kenyans. While this is a good
development, it remains unclear when this policy change
will be implemented. More important, how to provide
coverage to those working in the informal sector remains
a major challenge for universal coverage in Kenya. The
challenges of increasing health insurance coverage among
informal sector workers are well documented. Thailand,
for example, made slow progress towards universal cover-
age for many years, until the government decided to pur-
chase premiums for informal sector insurance using tax
funds [52]. As a part of the preparation towards imple-
menting the new financing strategy for universal coverage,
the Kenyan government should reconsider the equity
implications of covering informal sector workers through
contributory health insurance versus tax funding. Such
assessments should form the basis of moving the financial
debates in the country forward.
Until the translation to a national health insurance
fund is implemented, the NHIF will remain the main
source of health insurance in Kenya. The NHIF plays an
important role in protecting households from high inpa-
tient related costs, but the poor and those working in
the informal sector do not benefit from its services.
Efforts to increase NHIF coverage among those working
outside the formal sector have achieved limited success.
Consequently, there is very limited income cross-subsi-
disation in NHIF. The proposed national health insur-
ance scheme is regarded as the main mechanism
towards universal coverage. However, it is not clear how
the ‘new’ national insurance will address the low cover-
age levels experienced by the NHIF.
The government together with NHIF should identify
ways of how to best fund premiums for informal sector
workers, either through government tax or donor sup-
port. Should donors commit to contributing towards
premiums for the informal sector, this should be a short
term strategy as government puts measures in place to
offer financial protection to all its citizen.
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members seeking treatment in government and faith
based hospitals. Those seeking care from private hospi-
tals often incur OOPs since the benefit package only
meets a small percentage of inpatient costs. Large co-
payments undermine the financial risk protection pro-
vided through health insurance. It is important to design
an affordable and sustainable benefit package with mini-
mal or no copayments. Currently, the NHIF operates at
a surplus and spends a large proportion of revenue on
administration, while providing a very minimum benefit
package. Restructuring the NHIF to minimise the
administration costs can release funds for purchasing
comprehensive services to members. Finally, any
improvements in the NHIF benefit package should be
done in consideration of the wider health system, to
ensure that the goal of achieving universal coverage is
achieved.
A major limitation to most of the past and present
policy developments in Kenya is the failure to involve
the public in the identification and implementation of
policy interventions. Policies may have good intentions,
but translating them into practice and ensuring that the
intended gains are achieved can be a challenge [53]. The
government should engage with the public when design-
ing policies to promote universal coverage in order to
ensure that their preferences are adequately considered.
Engaging the public in early stages of policy design can
promote acceptability and thus contribute towards effec-
tive implementation.
Conclusion
The Kenyan health system is highly inequitable and
policies aimed at promoting equity and addressing the
needs of the poor and vulnerable have not been suc-
cessful. There is less commitment to increase the pro-
portion of government funds allocated to the health
sector. Some progress has been made towards addres-
sing equity challenge, including reducing user fees at
primary health care facilities and developing a health
financing strategy, but universal coverage is unlikely to
be achieved unless the country adopts a systemic
approach to health financing reforms. Such an approach
should be informed by the wider health system goals of
equity and efficiency.
Appendix 1: An overview of the Kenyan health
financing system
Revenue collection
Sources of funds
1. OOPs
2. General tax revenue
3. Social health insurance
4. Private health insurance
5. Donor funds to the government and private not-
for profit organizations
6. Community based health insurance
Contribution mechanisms
1. Direct taxes: payroll tax deductions, structured
progressively.
2. Indirect taxes
a. VAT charged at 16%, but some items are
exempted from tax.
b. Corporate income tax ranges from 20% to
37.5%.
c. Custom duty tax ranges from 0% for exempted
items to 40%.
d. Excise duties range from 0% to 120%
3. Out-of-pocket payment mechanisms
4. NHIF contributions
a. Payroll deductions for formal sector, payment
at designated centres for members outside the
formal sector.
b. For formal sector employees, contributions
range from 30 to 320 Kenya shillings per month.
c. Informal sector members contribute 160
Kenya shillings per month.
5. Private health insurance
a. Contributions are risk rated.
6. Community health insurance
a. Community rated contributions that are
decided following consultations with community
members.
Collecting organisation
1. All taxes and payroll contributions/deductions are
collected by the Kenya Revenue Authority.
2. Mandatory insurance contributions are collected
directly by the NHIF.
3. Private health insurance companies are paid
directly by the employer or individual clients to
insurance companies.
4. CBHIs have localized collection mechanisms.
Risk pooling
Coverage and composition of risk pools
1. NHIF covers all individuals working in the formal
sector and their dependents aged below 21 years.
Children aged above 21 years and who are still in
school are also entitled to benefits from their par-
ents’ membership. People in the non-formal sector
can join on a voluntary basis. There are approxi-
mately two million members from the formal sector,
and 250000 from the informal sector.
2. There are no risk pools with OOP payments and
only those who can afford receive health services
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thier population. Recently, private health insurance
companies have developed products that are afford-
able to middle income groups, but uptake remains
low.
4. CBHIs membership is limited and composed of
small scale farmers in rural areas.
Allocation mechanisms
1. Public revenue is allocated using a historical
approach. Two resource allocation formulas exist.
2. Expenditure patterns account for disease burden
but emphasis is currently shifting to the human
capital approach to health.
Purchasing services
Benefit package
1. Service type
a. NHIF covers inpatient cover for all illnesses
including emergencies. It offers a comprehensive
benefit package to members seeking care at pub-
lic hospitals. Those seeking care at faith based
facilities also enjoy comprehensive services but
are required to make a copayment of KES 15000
in case of surgery. For private-for-profit facilities,
individuals are entitled to a daily rate payment,
which ranges from KES 400-2000 depending on
the accreditation agreement.
b. Private insurance schemes provide cover
according to an individual’sp r e m i u mb a s e do n
ability to pays. The packages are predetermined
and potential clients choose a package whose
costs they can meet.
c. CBHIs mainly offer inpatient cover for all ill-
nesses at specific health facilities.
2. Type of provider
a. The NHIF accredits both government and pri-
vate health facilities.
b. Insurance companies either contract hospitals,
run own facilities (HMOs) or pay reimbursement
to providers for services rendered to clients.
c. CBHIs mainly work with faith based hospitals
within their catchment areas although a few offer
coverage in government hospitals.
3. Affordability and sustainability
a. NHIF packages are standard for all benefici-
aries and are affordable to those working in the
formal sector. Copayments remain a main barrier
to access and promote inequities.
b. Most high income earners can afford compre-
hensive individual insurance from private
companies
Provider payment mechanisms
1. Public providers are allocated a budget and
employees paid monthly salaries
2. Various private health insurance companies pay
on a case-based fees or fee-for-service to accredited
hospitals; others also provide services and pay them
employees salaries
3. Faith based facilities are allocated budgets by
donors and often charge a flat fee for basic illnesses
4. For OOPS, households pay fee-for-service to indi-
vidual providers
Service provision
1. The government is the main health care provider,
but there exists a significant private sector.
2. The NHIF purchases services from both public
and private health providers
3. There is a large number of independent providers
without contracts
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